By Andrew Tangel and Andy Pasztor
A Boeing Co. engineer involved in the development of the 737 MAX
claims the aerospace giant's managers overly prized controlling
costs and schedules at the expense of safety, allegations that are
currently part of a federal criminal investigation after two fatal
crashes of the aircraft.
An internal complaint filed by the engineer after the second
fatal MAX crash, in March, portrays Boeing's culture as one that
stifled criticism, internal debate and learning from crashes to
improve safety.
"There is a suppressive cultural attitude towards criticism of
corporate policy especially if that criticism comes as a result of
analysis of fatal accidents," the engineer, Curtis Ewbank, wrote in
the complaint.
A perception among employees that Boeing doesn't value candid
debate, Mr. Ewbank added, "has a negative effect on the safety
culture at Boeing."
Mr. Ewbank's complaint is among thousands of documents Boeing
has turned over to federal authorities as part of a criminal
investigation that is in its early stages, people familiar with the
matter said. Boeing hasn't been accused of any wrongdoing.
Mr. Ewbank, his complaint and issues it raised have come up in
at least one witness interview that included Justice Department
prosecutors and agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Transportation Department's inspector-general office, one of
these people said.
Boeing declined to comment on the complaint, but a spokesman
said: "Safety, quality and integrity are at the core of Boeing's
values. Boeing offers its employees a number of channels for
raising concerns and complaints and has rigorous processes in
place, both to ensure that such complaints receive thorough
consideration and to protect the confidentiality of employees who
make them."
The Seattle Times reported earlier on Mr. Ewbank's
complaint.
His complaint, totaling more than 5,000 words, offers an inside
glimpse at what one engineer alleges was a pattern of Boeing
managers playing down safety threats over the years, using cost as
a primary reason to reject various proposed design enhancements to
make the 737 MAX and predecessor models less prone to
accidents.
One of the examples the complaint cites pertains to a system
known as synthetic airspeed. Mr. Ewbank wrote that he had supported
adding the system to the 737 MAX, Boeing's latest version of its
best-selling single-aisle jet, arguing it would enhance safety.
Managers overseeing the creation of the new plane ultimately
rejected the system, however -- a decision Mr. Ewbank attributed to
associated costs to Boeing and to airlines, which could have been
required to provide their pilots additional training had the new
system been used.
But a person close to Boeing said company managers thoroughly
vetted Mr. Ewbank's arguments for the system and decided against it
because its potential benefits weren't clear and the system would
entail significant complications for the MAX's flight-control
system. This person described the engineer as earnest, competent
and steadfast in his views.
People familiar with the MAX development described the system as
potentially "nice to have" but not essential, and one that wouldn't
have had an effect on how faulty sensor data would trigger the
flight-control system known as MCAS that investigators have
implicated in the fatal accidents involving Lion Air and Ethiopian
Airlines.
In his complaint, Mr. Ewbank notes: "Given the complex nature of
the Lion Air and Ethiopian accidents it is not possible to say for
certain that any actual implementation of synthetic airspeed on the
737 MAX would have prevented the accidents."
Mr. Ewbank left Boeing earlier this decade after finding his
tenure there frustrating, according to Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing
cockpit-systems engineer. Mr. Ludtke recalls his former colleague
complaining that Boeing should add synthetic airspeed to the MAX if
the company cared about safety.
"He was taking a moral stand," Mr. Ludtke said.
Mr. Ewbank, who eventually returned to Boeing, didn't respond to
requests for comment.
Mr. Ewbank's complaint -- crammed with names, dates and
technical details -- alleges that during development of the MAX,
management repeatedly rejected as too expensive various potential
safety upgrades intended to increase the reliability of certain
sensors, along with upgraded cockpit-warning systems to make it
easier for pilots to react to emergencies.
The ethics complaint filed provides scant details about
development of the plane's automated stall-prevention system,
called MCAS, implicated in the dual crashes that have grounded the
global MAX fleet. It doesn't shed light on exactly why Boeing opted
to rely on a single sensor for critical data, a decision that led
to MCAS misfires that brought down two MAX jets in less than five
months.
But some of the specifics of related systems -- and details of
how management allegedly dealt with possible safety improvements --
raise questions about the aerospace giant's safety culture.
According to the ethics complaint, which was reviewed by The Wall
Street Journal, Boeing managers were aware of previous accidents
and internal company engineering studies highlighting the hazards
of such single-sensor systems.
Referring to Chairman and Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg's
statements asserting that the MAX fleet was safe, Mr. Ewbank
alleged that the CEO and other senior executives "seriously
misrepresented what Boeing engineering has learned" about safe
designs.
Boeing has maintained the MAX is safe, and the person close to
the manufacturer said the aircraft met industry and Federal
Aviation Administration safety requirements when the agency
certified it. Boeing had previously relied primarily on pilots to
use a long-standing emergency procedure to counteract an MCAS
misfire. Boeing is modifying the MCAS with greater safeguards,
including redesigning it to rely on two sensors.
Despite Boeing's pledges to listen carefully to internal safety
concerns and encourage confidential complaints without any threat
of reprisals to employees, Mr. Ewbank alleged that "the fear of
retaliation is high despite all official assurances" to the
contrary.
Mr. Muilenburg recently launched a restructuring of how the
company handles engineering and safety matters, after an internal
review following the MAX crashes.
The new structure's aims include reducing the influence of costs
and production schedules over engineering decisions, and giving
greater attention to employees' safety concerns. The goal, Mr.
Muilenburg said, is to enhance safety so the aviation industry can
better learn from accidents and improve.
"We know we can always do better," Mr. Muilenburg said Wednesday
at a meeting of the Economic Club of New York.
Separately, on Wednesday the Federal Aviation Administration
mandated urgent structural inspections of some 160 Boeing 737 NG
models, which predate the MAX design, along with subsequent checks
and repairs, as necessary, affecting more than 1,700 other NG jets
operated by U.S. carriers. The first round of checks must be
completed within seven days.
The potential cracks, which Boeing told U.S. authorities and
carriers about last month, "could adversely affect the structural
integrity of the airplane and result in loss of control," according
to the FAA's directive.
The order comes two days after a separate FAA proposal to
inspect and possibly repair problems with other fuselage components
on some 750 737 NGs in the U.S., which the FAA said could result in
"uncontrolled decompression and loss of structural integrity."
Neither of the structural issues has caused in-flight events,
and the FAA's orders aren't expected to keep any planes
grounded.
Write to Andrew Tangel at Andrew.Tangel@wsj.com and Andy Pasztor
at andy.pasztor@wsj.com
(END) Dow Jones Newswires
October 02, 2019 19:33 ET (23:33 GMT)
Copyright (c) 2019 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
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