Risks Relating to General Credit Characteristics
The Notes Are Subject to the Credit Risk of the Issuer
The notes are unsubordinated, unsecured debt obligations of the issuer, UBS, and are not, either directly or indirectly, an obligation of any third party. Any payment to be made on the notes, including any repayment of principal, depends on the ability of UBS to satisfy its obligations as they come due. As a result, the actual and perceived creditworthiness of UBS may affect the market value of the notes and, in the event UBS were to default on its obligations, you may not receive any amounts owed to you under the terms of the notes and you could lose your entire initial investment.
The Notes Are Not Bank Deposits
An investment in the notes carries risks which are very different from the risk profile of a bank deposit placed with UBS or its affiliates. The notes have different yield and/or return, liquidity and risk profiles and would not benefit from any protection provided to deposits.
If UBS Experiences Financial Difficulties, FINMA Has the Power to Open Restructuring or Liquidation Proceedings in Respect of, and/or Impose Protective Measures in Relation to, UBS, Which Proceedings or Measures May Have a Material Adverse Effect on the Terms and Market Value of the Notes and/or the Ability of UBS to Make Payments Thereunder
The Swiss Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks of November 8, 1934, as amended (the “Swiss Banking Act”) grants the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (“FINMA”) broad powers to take measures and actions in relation to UBS if it concludes that there is justified concern that UBS is over-indebted or has serious liquidity problems or, after expiry of a deadline, UBS fails to fulfill the applicable capital adequacy requirements (whether on a standalone or consolidated basis). If one of these pre-requisites is met, FINMA is authorized to open restructuring proceedings or liquidation (bankruptcy) proceedings in respect of, and/or impose protective measures in relation to, UBS. The Swiss Banking Act grants significant discretion to FINMA in connection with the aforementioned proceedings and measures. In particular, a broad variety of protective measures may be imposed by FINMA, including a bank moratorium or a maturity postponement, which measures may be ordered by FINMA either on a stand-alone basis or in connection with restructuring or liquidation proceedings.
In restructuring proceedings, FINMA, as resolution authority, is competent to approve the restructuring plan. The restructuring plan may, among other things, provide for (a) the transfer of all or a portion of UBS’ assets, debts, other liabilities and contracts (which may or may not include the contractual relationship between UBS and the holders of notes) to another entity, (b) a stay (for a maximum of two business days) on the termination of contracts to which UBS is a party, and/or the exercise of (w) rights to terminate, (x) netting rights, (y) rights to enforce or dispose of collateral or (z) rights to transfer claims, liabilities or collateral under contracts to which UBS is a party, (c) the partial or full conversion of UBS’ debt and/or other obligations, including its obligations under the notes, into equity (a “debt-to-equity” swap), and/or (d) the partial or full write-off of obligations owed by UBS (a “write-off”), including its obligations under the notes. Prior to any debt-to-equity swap or write-off with respect to any notes, outstanding equity and debt instruments issued by UBS qualifying as additional tier 1 capital or tier 2 capital must be converted or written-down, as applicable, and cancelled. The Swiss Banking Act addresses the order in which a debt-to-equity swap or a write-off of debt instruments (other than debt instruments qualifying as additional tier 1 capital or tier 2 capital) should occur: first, all subordinated obligations not qualifying as regulatory capital; second, debt instruments for loss absorbency in the course of insolvency measures (Schuldinstrumente zur Verlusttragung im Falle von Insolvenzmassnahmen) under the Swiss Ordinance concerning Capital Adequacy and Risk Diversification for Banks and Securities Dealers of June 1, 2012, as amended; third, all other obligations not excluded by law from a debt-to-equity swap or write-off (other than deposits), such as the notes; and fourth, deposits to the extent in excess of the amount privileged by law. However, given the broad discretion granted to FINMA, any restructuring plan approved by FINMA in connection with restructuring proceedings with respect to UBS could provide that the claims under or in connection with the notes will be fully or partially converted into equity or written-off, while preserving other obligations of UBS that rank pari passu with UBS’ obligations under the notes. Consequently, the exercise by FINMA of any of its statutory resolution powers or any suggestion of any such exercise could materially adversely affect the rights of holders of the notes, the price or value of their investment in the notes and/or the ability of UBS to satisfy its obligations under the notes and could lead to holders losing some or all of their investment in the notes.
Once FINMA has opened restructuring proceedings with respect to UBS, it may consider factors such as the results of operations, financial condition (in particular, the level of indebtedness, potential future losses and/or restructuring costs), liquidity profile and regulatory capital adequacy of UBS and its subsidiaries, or any other factors of its choosing, when determining whether to exercise any of its statutory resolution powers with respect to UBS, including, if it chooses to exercise such powers to order a debt-to- equity swap and/or a write-off, whether to do so in full or in part. The criteria that FINMA may consider in exercising any statutory resolution power provide it with considerable discretion. Therefore, holders of the notes may not be able to refer to publicly available criteria in order to anticipate a potential exercise of any such power and, consequently, its potential effects on the notes and/or UBS.
If UBS were to be subject to restructuring proceedings, the creditors whose claims are affected by the restructuring plan would not have a right to vote on, reject, or seek the suspension of the restructuring plan. In addition, if a restructuring plan with respect to UBS has been approved by FINMA, the rights of a creditor to challenge the restructuring plan or have the restructuring plan reviewed by a judicial or administrative process or otherwise (e.g., on the grounds that the plan would unduly prejudice the rights of holders of notes or otherwise be in violation of the Swiss Banking Act) are very limited. Even if any of UBS’ creditors were to successfully challenge the restructuring plan in court, the court could only require the relevant creditors to be compensated ex post and there is currently no guidance as to on what basis such compensation would be calculated and how it would be funded. Any such challenge (even if successful) would not suspend, or result in the suspension of, the implementation of the restructuring plan.