or economic conditions, such as changes in interest rates and financial market values, could affect the businesses and the results of operations of our subsidiaries and, therefore, adversely affect the sources of funds available to us.
In addition, our right to participate in a distribution of assets upon a subsidiary’s liquidation or reorganization, and thus the ability of a holder of our debt securities (including the notes) to benefit indirectly from such distributions, is subject to the prior claims of the subsidiary’s creditors. This subordination of creditors of a parent company to prior claims of creditors of its subsidiaries is commonly referred to as structural subordination. Furthermore, our rights as a creditor of our subsidiaries may be subordinate to any security interest in the assets of those subsidiaries and any obligations of those subsidiaries senior to those held by us.
As discussed further below, federal banking regulators require measures to facilitate the continued operation of operating subsidiaries notwithstanding the failure of their parent companies, and our ability to receive funds from our subsidiaries may be limited by the Support Agreement discussed in the following risk factors. Further, dividend payments to us from our subsidiaries may also be restricted if specified liquidity and/or capital metrics fall below defined triggers or if our board of directors authorizes us to file a case under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
The Resolution Of Wells Fargo Under The Orderly Liquidation Authority Could Result In Greater Losses For Holders Of Our Debt Securities, Including The Notes, Particularly If A Single-Point-Of-Entry Strategy Is Used.
Your ability to recover the full amount that would otherwise be payable on our debt securities (including the notes) in a proceeding under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code may be impaired by the exercise by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”) of its powers under the “orderly liquidation authority” under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”). In particular, the single point of entry strategy described below is intended to impose losses at the top-tier holding company level in the resolution of a Global Systemically Important Bank (“G-SIB”) such as Wells Fargo.
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act created a new resolution regime known as the “orderly liquidation authority” to which financial companies, including bank holding companies such as Wells Fargo, can be subjected. Under the orderly liquidation authority, the FDIC may be appointed as receiver for a financial company for purposes of liquidating the entity if, upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “FRB”) and the FDIC, the United States Secretary of the Treasury determines, among other things, that the entity is in severe financial distress, that the entity’s failure would have serious adverse effects on the U.S. financial system and that resolution under the orderly liquidation authority would avoid or mitigate those effects. Absent such determinations, Wells Fargo, as a bank holding company, would remain subject to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
If the FDIC is appointed as receiver under the orderly liquidation authority, then the orderly liquidation authority, rather than the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, would determine the powers of the receiver and the rights and obligations of creditors and other parties who have transacted with Wells Fargo. There are substantial differences between the rights available to creditors in the orderly liquidation authority and under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, including the right of the FDIC under the orderly liquidation authority to disregard the strict priority of creditor claims in some circumstances (which would otherwise be respected by a bankruptcy court) and the use of an administrative claims procedure to determine creditors’ claims (as opposed to the judicial procedure utilized in bankruptcy proceedings). In certain circumstances under the orderly liquidation authority, the FDIC could elevate the priority of claims if it determines that doing so is necessary to facilitate an orderly liquidation without the need to obtain the consent of other creditors or prior court review. In addition, under the orderly liquidation authority, the FDIC has the right to transfer assets or liabilities of the failed company to a third party or “bridge” entity.
The FDIC has indicated that a “single point of entry” strategy may be a desirable strategy to resolve a large financial institution such as Wells Fargo in a manner that would, among other things, impose losses on shareholders, unsecured debt holders (including, in our case, holders of our debt securities, including the notes) and other creditors of the top-tier holding company (in our case, Wells Fargo), while permitting the holding company’s subsidiaries to continue to operate. In addition, in December 2016, the FRB finalized rules requiring U.S. G-SIBs, including Wells Fargo, to maintain minimum amounts of long-term debt and total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC). It is possible that the application of the single point of entry strategy—in which Wells Fargo would be the only legal entity to enter resolution proceedings—could result in greater losses to holders of our debt securities (including the notes) than the losses that would result from a different resolution strategy for Wells Fargo. Assuming Wells Fargo entered resolution proceedings and that support from Wells Fargo to its subsidiaries was sufficient to enable the subsidiaries to remain solvent, losses at the subsidiary level could be transferred to Wells Fargo and ultimately borne by Wells Fargo’s security holders (including holders of our unsecured debt securities, including the notes), with the result that third-