Risks Relating to General Credit Characteristics
■Any payment on the securities is subject to the creditworthiness of UBS. The securities are unsubordinated, unsecured debt obligations of UBS and are not, either directly or indirectly, an obligation of any third party. Any payment to be made on the securities, including any repayment of principal, depends on the ability of UBS to satisfy its obligations as they come due. As a result, UBS’ actual and perceived creditworthiness may affect the market value of the securities. If UBS were to default on its obligations, you may not receive any amounts owed to you under the terms of the securities and you could lose all of your initial investment.
■The securities are not bank deposits. An investment in the securities carries risks that are very different from the risk profile of a bank deposit placed with UBS or its affiliates. The securities have different yield and/or return, liquidity and risk profiles and would not benefit from any protection provided to deposits.
■If UBS experiences financial difficulties, FINMA has the power to open restructuring or liquidation proceedings in respect of, and/or impose protective measures in relation to, UBS, which proceedings or measures may have a material adverse effect on the terms and market value of the securities and/or the ability of UBS to make payments thereunder. The Swiss Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks of November 8, 1934, as amended (the “Swiss Banking Act”) grants the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (“FINMA”) broad powers to take measures and actions in relation to UBS if it concludes that there is justified concern that UBS is over-indebted or has serious liquidity problems or, after expiry of a deadline, UBS fails to fulfill the applicable capital adequacy requirements (whether on a standalone or consolidated basis). If one of these pre-requisites is met, FINMA is authorized to open restructuring proceedings or liquidation (bankruptcy) proceedings in respect of, and/or impose protective measures in relation to, UBS. The Swiss Banking Act grants significant discretion to FINMA in connection with the aforementioned proceedings and measures. In particular, a broad variety of protective measures may be imposed by FINMA, including a bank moratorium or a maturity postponement, which measures may be ordered by FINMA either on a stand-alone basis or in connection with restructuring or liquidation proceedings.
In restructuring proceedings, FINMA, as resolution authority, is competent to approve the restructuring plan. The restructuring plan may, among other things, provide for (a) the transfer of all or a portion of UBS’ assets, debts, other liabilities and contracts (which may or may not include the contractual relationship between UBS and the holders of securities) to another entity, (b) a stay (for a maximum of two business days) on the termination of contracts to which UBS is a party, and/or the exercise of (w) rights to terminate, (x) netting rights, (y) rights to enforce or dispose of collateral or (z) rights to transfer claims, liabilities or collateral under contracts to which UBS is a party, (c) the partial or full conversion of UBS’ debt and/or other obligations, including its obligations under the securities, into equity (a “debt-to-equity” swap), and/or (d) the partial or full write-off of obligations owed by UBS (a “write-off”), including its obligations under the securities. Prior to any debt-to-equity swap or write-off with respect to any securities, outstanding equity and debt instruments issued by UBS qualifying as additional tier 1 capital or tier 2 capital must be converted or written-down, as applicable, and cancelled. The Swiss Banking Act addresses the order in which a debt-to-equity swap or a write-off of debt instruments (other than debt instruments qualifying as additional tier 1 capital or tier 2 capital) should occur: first, all subordinated obligations not qualifying as regulatory capital; second, debt instruments for loss absorbency in the course of insolvency measures (Schuldinstrumente zur Verlusttragung im Falle von Insolvenzmassnahmen) under the Swiss Ordinance concerning Capital Adequacy and Risk Diversification for Banks and Securities Dealers of June 1, 2012, as amended; third, all other obligations not excluded by law from a debt-to-equity swap or write-off (other than deposits), such as the securities; and fourth, deposits to the extent in excess of the amount privileged by law. However, given the broad discretion granted to FINMA, any restructuring plan approved by FINMA in connection with restructuring proceedings with respect to UBS could provide that the claims under or in connection with the securities will be fully or partially converted into equity or written-off, while preserving other obligations of UBS that rank pari passu with UBS’ obligations under the securities. Consequently, the exercise by FINMA of any of its statutory resolution powers or any suggestion of any such exercise could materially adversely affect the rights of holders of the securities, the price or value of their investment in the securities and/or the ability of UBS to satisfy its obligations under the securities and could lead to holders losing some or all of their investment in the securities.
Once FINMA has opened restructuring proceedings with respect to UBS, it may consider factors such as the results of operations, financial condition (in particular, the level of indebtedness, potential future losses and/or restructuring costs), liquidity profile and regulatory capital adequacy of UBS and its subsidiaries, or any other factors of its choosing, when determining whether to exercise any of its statutory resolution powers with respect to UBS, including, if it chooses to exercise such powers to order a debt-to- equity swap and/or a write-off, whether to do so in full or in part. The criteria that FINMA may consider in exercising any statutory resolution power provide it with considerable discretion. Therefore, holders of the securities may not be able to refer to publicly available criteria in order to anticipate a potential exercise of any such power and, consequently, its potential effects on the securities and/or UBS.
If UBS were to be subject to restructuring proceedings, the creditors whose claims are affected by the restructuring plan would not have a right to vote on, reject, or seek the suspension of the restructuring plan. In addition, if a restructuring plan with respect to UBS has been approved by FINMA, the rights of a creditor to challenge the restructuring plan or have the restructuring plan reviewed by a